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ABSTRACT
In the article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby
live?’ arguments are made in favour of the moral
permissibility of intentionally killing newborn infants,
under particular conditions. Here we argue that their
arguments are based on an indefensible view of
personhood, and we question the logic of harm and
interest that informs their arguments. Furthermore, we
argue that the conclusions here are so contrary to
ordinary moral intuitions that the argument and
conclusions based upon it—including those which
defend more mainstream methods of abortion—should
be treated with immediate suspicion.
THE NEWBORN AS ‘NOT A PERSON’
Giubilini and Minerva claim that ‘a particular
moral status can be attached to a non-person by
virtue of the value an actual person (e.g. the
mother) attributes to it’ and they recognise this as a
‘subjective’ account of the moral status of the
newborn. However, they maintain that this subject-
ive account does not ‘debunk their previous argu-
ment’. The previous argument to which the
authors refer is not entirely clear, but presumably
they are referring to the argument that it is the
level of mental development which determines
whether or not the fetus or newborn is a person.1
However, the assertion that the moral status of
fetuses and newborns depends upon the value
which the mother attributes them would suggest
that the status of fetuses and newborns will ﬂuctu-
ate according to the views of their mothers and
perhaps others involved (as regards those ‘actual’
people’s rights and interests). This is a curious
assertion, since the moral status of a fetus becomes
relative to those attributing that status and hence
decisions about such moral status are open to
inconsistency and even contradiction—for example,
in cases in which a mother and father disagreed
about the status of the fetus.
In fact the actual people involved in decision-
making might differ on the moral status to be
attributed to the fetus or infant and as regards their
own rights and interests and their views of what
constitutes an unbearable burden in relation to con-
tinuing a pregnancy. Giubilini and Minerva argue
against adoption as an alternative to after-birth
adoption, claiming that the argument from potenti-
ality is not strong enough to outweigh the consider-
ation of the interests of a natural mother for whom
adoption might be more traumatic than abortion.1
However, if the interests of those actual people
involved were to clash, this argument is, at the very
least, incomplete since surely their rights and inter-
ests are balanced by their responsibilities toward
actual others (as generated, in the account of
Giubilini and Minerva, by the interests of those
actual persons involved) and—we would argue—
toward fetuses and newborns. One cannot be
consequentialist in some scenarios and not others;
once the bed is made it must be slept in.
Giubilini and Minerva have the support of
Michael Tooley in arguing that it is the level of
mental development and the capacity to make
aims, attribute value to and appreciate one’s own
life which allows an individual being to be regarded
as a ‘person’. In his article, ‘Abortion and
Infanticide’, Tooley clearly recognises that a
defence of infanticide requires that one ‘get very
clear about what makes something a person, what
gives something a right to life’.2 He argues that
human fetuses and infants are not persons since
they do not have the properties a thing must
possess in order to have a right to life. To be a
‘person’ one must have a serious right to life.2 For
Tooley, ‘[a]n organism possesses a serious right to
life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a
continuing subject of experiences and other
mental states, and believes that it is itself such a
continuing entity’.2
Peter Singer also challenges the view that the
fetus has the status of a person. Like Tooley, he
argues that the terms ‘human being’ and ‘person’
are not equivalent.3 He notes that the word
‘person’ has its origin in the Latin term for a mask
put on by actors in ancient classical dramas to
signify the fact that the actor was playing a role;
and that John Locke provided the philosophical
precedent for our assumptions about the person by
deﬁning a person as ‘a thinking intelligent being
that has reason and reﬂection and can consider
itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different
times and places’.3
It is Singer’s contention that the embryo and the
fetus cannot be persons given that they lack the
capacities which identify human beings as persons,
even though they are without doubt human.
The embryo, the later fetus, the profoundly intel-
lectually disabled child, even the newborn infant –
are all indisputably members of the species Homo
sapiens, but none are self-aware, have a sense of
the future, or the capacity to relate to others.3
The approach of Giubilini and Minerva to the
question of whether or not the zygote or fetus is a
person has two problematic aspects. First, like
Tooley and Singer, the authors provide a deﬁnition
of personhood which depends on properties that
justify a right to life—properties which fetuses and
infants do not possess, except in potential form; a
distinction between persons and members of the
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species Homo sapiens is maintained and it is stipulated that
human beings cannot be assigned a right to life simply on the
basis of their membership of the species. Giubilini and Minerva
support this view by noting that many humans are not consid-
ered subjects of a right to life, including spare embryos used for
embryonic stem cell research, fetuses in cases where abortion is
permitted and criminals where capital punishment is legal.1
These descriptive examples of common practice miss the point,
given that it is the moral permissibility of the ﬁrst two of these
actions which is in question; and that in the third example there
is a distinction between questions of the legality of capital pun-
ishment by comparison with its moral permissibility. So before
we accept the frightening premises of their argument, we might
fairly ask Giubilini and Minerva on what philosophical basis
(common practices aside) they rest their argument regarding the
moral status of the fetus? Their assertion that all fetuses and
newborns fail a ‘self-consciousness’ or ‘self-awareness’ require-
ment does not undermine the competing assertion that all
human beings have a right to life. Equally their argument that
only actual persons involved can attribute the moral status of
person to fetuses and newborns is inadequate since the attribu-
tion becomes inconsistent and even contradictory given that it is
relative to the particular actual persons whose own views may
vary over time or conﬂict.
THE NEWBORN AS IMPOSSIBLE TO HARM
‘After-birth abortion’ rests on a number of key philosophical
claims. Primary among them is acceptance of a deﬁnition of per-
sonhood closely connected to rationality (as discussed above),
but equally important is the account of Giubilini and Minerva
of harm. In short, the article mounts the normative claim that
because a newly born infant does not enjoy the moral status of
personhood, the termination of that infant should not be
regarded as doing any harm: ‘It is not possible to damage a
newborn by preventing her from developing the potentiality to
become a person in the morally relevant sense’.1
This is a controversial claim, although the authors mask the
controversy of it by asserting the signiﬁcance that harm and per-
sonhood are somehow connected without providing any justiﬁ-
cation for doing so.
The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus in
the sense that both lack those properties that justify the attribu-
tion of a right to life to an individual. Both a fetus and a
newborn certainly are human beings and potential persons, but
neither is a ‘person’ in the sense of ‘subject of a moral right to
life’. We take ‘person’ to mean an individual who is capable of
attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such
that being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her. This
means that many nonhuman animals and mentally retarded
human individuals are persons, but that all the individuals who
are not in the condition of attributing value to their own exist-
ence are not persons.1
Harms, as Giubilini and Minerva argue, are only done when
that which has been taken away (X) actually represents a loss to
the fetus. ‘This means that many nonhuman animals and men-
tally retarded human individuals are persons, but that all the
individuals who are not in the condition of attributing any value
to their own existence are not persons’.1 X, on this understand-
ing, is a good whose value lays its desirability to the subject; my
desire to become a professor at my University is harmed when
the manuscript of a book I am working on is stolen. The reason
for this harm is that I have attributed value to X (attaining a
professorship), and the possibility of achieving X has now been
taken away from me. Furthermore, part of my own self-identity
and self-valuation is derived from the fact that I can imagine
myself attaining the goal to which I have attributed value. It is
clear that I could not be harmed if (a) there was nothing to
which I attributed value, (b) I was unable to attribute value to
anything or (c) I possessed everything that I valued and was
unable to lose it.i Fetuses, for Giubulini and Minerva, fall into
category (b).
Although there is a consistency to the argument by which
Giubilini and Minerva reach the above conclusion, they fail to
acknowledge that this argument relies on a particularly narrow
understanding of harm which originates in Joel Feinberg’s 1987
work The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. That work, the
most comprehensive philosophical treatment of harm, offers the
now-popularised deﬁnition of harm as ‘wrongful setback to
interest’.4 However, although Feinberg places ‘interest’ (and, by
extension, value-attributing capacities) at the heart of his treatise
on harm, the narrowness of Giubilini and Minerva is not neces-
sarily justiﬁable on a closer examination of Feinberg and a focus
on what he calls ‘welfare interests’.
The distinction between the type of interests that Giubilini
and Minerva are interested in and welfare interests is outlined
by Feinberg in a section entitled ‘Welfare Interests and Ulterior
Interests’:
The importance of an interest to the well-being of its possessor
can be determined by two different standards. According to one
of these, a person’s more ultimate goals and aspirations are his
more important ones: such aims as producing good novels or
works of art, solving a crucial scientiﬁc problem, achieving high
political ofﬁce, successfully raising a family, achieving leisure for
handicraft or sport, building a dream house, advancing a social
cause, ameliorating human suffering, achieving spiritual grace.4
These interests do require the psychological capacity to attri-
bute value: the capacity to imagine the instantiation of a particu-
lar good and subsequently envision one’s personal situation as
improved as a result of that instantiation. It is these interests
that Giubilini and Minerva deny, and subsequently they deny
any harm; there can be no wrongful setback to interest if there
is no interest.
However, Feinberg’s interests are not limited to the above.
He also has a concept of welfare interests: those things in which
someone has a stake because the absence of them would make
the instantiation of more powerfully desired goods impossible.
By a quite different and equally plausible standard, however, a
person’s most important interests are by no means as grand and
impressive as these. They are rather his interests, presumably of a
kind shared by nearly all his fellows, in the necessary means to
his more ultimate goals, whatever the latter may be, or later
come to be. In this category are the interests in the continuance
for a foreseeable interval of one’s life, and the interests in one’s
own physical health and vigor, the integrity and normal function-
ing of one’s body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering or
grotesque disﬁgurement, minimal intellectual acuity, emotional
stability, the absence of groundless anxieties and resentments, the
capacity to engage normally in social intercourse and to enjoy
and maintain friendships, at least minimal income and ﬁnancial
security, a tolerable social and physical environment, and a
certain amount of freedom from interference and coercion.
These are interests in conditions that are generalized means to a
great variety of possible goals and whose joint realization, in the
iThis was the basis of Stoic philosophy’s denial of external goods, and
Aristotle’s description of the megalopsychos.
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absence of very special circumstances, is necessary for the
achievement of more ultimate aims.4
So, welfare interests enable an individual to achieve ulterior
interests, even if those ulterior interests do not yet exist (note
Feinberg’s explicit qualiﬁcation ‘whatever the latter may be, or
later come to be’). And, given that the latter actualisation of an
ulterior interest depends on the development of
value-attributing capacities, it would be consistent with
Feinberg’s work to say that the denial of that development con-
stitutes a serious harm, for all harms to welfare interests are
morally grave. As Feinberg puts it:
When [welfare interests] are blocked or damaged, a person is
very seriously harmed indeed, for in that case his more ultimate
aspirations are defeated too; whereas setbacks to a higher goal do
not to the same degree inﬂict damage on the whole network of
his interests.4
In reality, the interests and harms whose existence Giubilini
and Minerva ignored in their article are in fact equally (if not
more) morally signiﬁcant as those on which they focus, and the
two different types of interests exist in relation to one another,
not in isolation, so that lacking one type of interest does not
mean one might not be harmed. My interest in becoming a
professor relies also on continuing academic freedom in
Australia; a welfare interest which if harmed will also harmful
to my ulterior interest.
A further problem with the account of harms of Minerva and
Giubilini is that they understand the role of interests, but not
the less subjective concept of stakes. Consider their following
comments:
There are many ways in which an individual can be harmed, and
not all of them require that she values or is even aware of what
she is deprived of. A person might be ‘harmed’ when someone
steals from her the winning lottery ticket even if she will never
ﬁnd out that her ticket was the winning one. Or a person might
be ‘harmed’ if something were done to her at the stage of
fetus which affects for the worse her quality of life as a person
(e.g., her mother took drugs during pregnancy), even if she is
not aware of it. However, in such cases we are talking about a
person who is at least in the condition to value the different situ-
ation she would have found herself in if she had not been
harmed. And such a condition depends on the level of her
mental development, which in turn determines whether or not
she is a ‘person’.1
The reason that the child affected by a mother’s drinking is
harmed is because that child held a stake in his mother’s sobri-
ety. ‘[A] person has a stake in X (whether X be a company, a
career, or some kind of “issue” of events) when he stands to
gain or lose depending on the nature or condition of X’.4
Feinberg then connects stakes to interests, arguing that ‘[o]ne’s
interests, then, taken as a miscellaneous collection, consist of all
those things in which one has a stake’.4 Not all interests, there-
fore, require any value-attributing capacity for their existence;
in fact, given that (as the article acknowledges) the newborn
baby is a bundle of potentialities,ii one might say that the
newborn in fact has more interests and stakes than an adult
because there are avenues of activity which the infant still has
the capacity to achieve and which, therefore, the infant still has
some stake in, regardless of their status as value-attributing (a
status the article calls personhood) or not.
So far we have cast suspicion on the philosophical depth of
the exposition of harm of Giubilini and Minerva, and on the
connection among harms, interests and personhood (understood
as the ability to attribute value), but ﬁnally, we must show what
signiﬁcance this has for their argument as a whole. The discus-
sion of harm in ‘After-birth abortion’ is offered to support the
following normative claim:
[N]ot only aims but also well-developed plans are concepts that
certainly apply to those people (parents, siblings, society) who
could be negatively or positively affected by the birth of that
child [but do not apply to the newborn infant]. Therefore, the
rights and interests of the actual people involved should represent
the prevailing consideration in a decision about abortion and
after-birth abortion.1
However, aims and well-developed plans are concepts that do
apply to infants, because of their stake in the protection of
value-attributing capacity-development (a welfare interest for
those with the potential to develop such capacities). This, in
addition to the myriad capacities (and subsequent interests) that
infants possess, implies that the primacy of the parents’ ulterior
interests over the welfare interests of the child should be ques-
tioned. There simply does not appear to be an argument for the
parents’ interests being morally preferable within the logic of
interest and harm.
OUR INTUITIONS
Tooley notes that the typical reaction to infanticide is like the
reaction to incest or cannibalism.2 We might do well to consider
the weight and the reasonableness of such intuitive reactions.
Ethical decision-making involves reference to our feelings,
everyday judgements and intuitions about behaviour as well as
to the principles to which we subscribe. The process of achiev-
ing a balance between these aspects of ethical decision-making
may lead us to question our intuitions, but equally it may indi-
cate that the principles to which we subscribe are problematic or
even indefensible.iii
An argument such as that of Giubilini and Minerva, which
countenances infanticide or after-birth abortion, provides an
occasion to question the force of the principles to which
Giubilini and Minerva subscribe. They provide us with the
opportunity to consider whether the claim that only those
human beings who satisfy a ‘consciousness’ or ‘self-awareness’
requirement have a right to life is defensible as a moral prin-
ciple; and whether the claim that the rights and interests of the
actual people involved in a decision about the permissibility of
abortion or after-birth abortion can provide us with clear guid-
ance, and if so, whether those rights and interests should be
taken to be the prevailing consideration in such a decision.
When discussions of infanticide previously came to the fore
through the work of Peter Singer, one of Singer’s most out-
spoken critics was fellow Australian Raimond Gaita. However,
Gaita sought to fault the logical premises in the argument, and
pointed to the conclusion itself as evidence of the invalidity
of Singer’s views. For Gaita, a conclusion that contradicts a
basic moral intuition such as ‘a newborn baby is precious
and should be protected’ is sufﬁcient evidence to dismiss
the argument. Gaita argues that these types of arguments are
based in a new myth:
iiSee,1 ‘The fetus and newborn are potential persons’.
iiiThis is a Rawlsian view of ethical decision-making as an exercise in
achieving ‘reﬂective equilibrium’ which Cohen and Grace explore in.5
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[T]he myth that a serious thinker – a true thinker – will fear to
think nothing. She will follow reason wherever it takes her, no
matter how frightened or morally disgusted she might be at the
prospect of embracing the conclusions it delivers to her.6
Gaita suggests that our moral intuitions matter: ‘the innocent
should be protected from harm’ used to be a starting point for
classes in moral philosophy, a claim with which everyone would
agree. The point of using that claim in class was to show that
morality is displayed in important shared values which all
people recognise and accept, whether or not they are moral
philosophers.
As well as identifying the logical and philosophical ﬂaws in
the argument of Giubilini and Minerva, we point to their con-
clusions supporting after-birth abortion as grounds for dismiss-
ing the arguments and reconsidering these arguments as they
are used to justify more common abortion practices. If reasoning
of this kind can lead us to conclusions which are abhorrent to
many, it might be time to review those arguments, as Gaita
acknowledges in his commentary on Singer:
If Singer’s arguments for infanticide are now accepted as deserv-
ing of serious consideration, it is not just because of their logical
force. It is because changes in the culture have disposed us to
accept a conclusion that only thirty years ago discredited any
arguments that led to it.6
There are very forceful logical reasons for dismissing the
claims of Giubilini and Minerva and we have outlined them
here. Besides deferring to the very social norms they are trying
to question and reform, they lack any justiﬁcation for their
distinction between human beings and persons; they are select-
ive in their application of interest; and incoherent in their
account of harm. However, as well as these problems, we
believe that our commonly shared moral intuitions matter and
arguments that contradict them should be treated with grave
suspicion. On this basis alone, the arguments of Giubilini and
Minerva should be rigorously interrogated, and in our view
they are found to be indefensible. We leave the ﬁnal word to
Gaita:
Were my commitment to philosophy to tempt to me such nihil-
ism, I would give up philosophy, fearful of what I was
becoming.6
Author note This article provides another perspective on the postbirth abortion
issue, considering other perspectives on personhood, harm, interest and the function
of moral intuitions in moral reasoning.
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